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In today’s highly globalized world, America’s status as a “nation of immigrants”
faces many new challenges.1 Although there are approximately 11.3 million
immigrants residing in the United States today, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has the resources to remove less than 400,000 aliens each year.2
Consequently, the concept of executive prosecutorial discretion has played an

* J.D. 2018, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. I would like to thank Executive
ILJ Online Editor Brooke Blackwell and the entire team of Online Editors for their hard work
and diligence throughout the publication process; I would also like to express my gratitude to
Professor Johnsen for her helpful feedback and instruction during the drafting of this Note.
1. In light of factors including an enormous and steadily increasing immigration
population and heightened concern over foreigners caused by the War on Terror, the issue of
illegal immigration has been “catapulted to the top of the national agenda.” See, e.g., Ingrid v.
Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U.L. REV. 1281, 1281 (2010); Daniel Kanstroom,
Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th “Pale of
Law”, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 641–50 (2004).
2. The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain
Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 OP. OFF.
LEGAL COUNSEL 1, 1 (2014) [hereinafter OLC Opinion].
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increasingly important role in the development of U.S. immigration law. Tasked with
overbearing caseloads and armed with such limited resources, enforcement officers
necessarily must refrain from exercising the full scope of their enforcement power.
“Prosecutorial discretion extends to decisions about which offenses or populations
to target; whom to stop, interrogate, and arrest; whether to detain or to release a
noncitizen; whether to initiate removal proceedings; whether to execute a removal
order; and various other decisions.”3
While deferred action is a long established and traditionally accepted doctrine,
President Obama’s chief immigration initiatives, Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA) and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful
Permanents Residents (DAPA) have recently sparked a national dialogue regarding
the precise scope of the executive’s authority in this area. The controversy arose after
Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson announced a new immigration policy
allowing certain aliens who arrived in the United States on or before January 1, 2010
to apply for deferred action.4 Together, the extended version of DACA and DAPA
apply to individuals who came to the United States as children under the age of
sixteen as well as parents of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents.5
DAPA was expected to affect approximately 3.7 million immigrants currently
residing in the United States.6
The Obama administration declared DAPA to be a lawful exercise of the
executive’s enforcement discretion, but opponents insist that DAPA grossly
exceeded the limits of the executive’s power by making “a programmatic decision to
confer benefits on millions of aliens—a significant policy decision that belongs to
Congress.”7 Such was the challenge brought by several states in the Supreme Court
case United States v. Texas—yet rather than bringing clarity to the heated debate, the
Supreme Court simply issued a non-precedential per curiam opinion affirming the
lower court’s decision.8
The debate gained new significance following the 2016 presidential election.
Throughout his campaign, President Trump advocated for a complete immigration
policy change, one that involves building “an impenetrable physical wall on the
southern border,” “immediately terminat[ing] President Obama’s two illegal
executive amnesties,” and “turn[ing] off the jobs and benefits magnet.”9 President

3. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law,
9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 244 (2010).
4. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T,
https://www.ice.gov/daca [https://perma.cc/3D7B-WKP4].
5. Id.
6. Manuel Pastor, Tom Jawetz & Lizet Ocampo, DAPA Matters: The Growing
Electorate Directly Affected by Executive Action on Immigration, CTR. FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS (Nov. 19, 2015, 12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
immigration/reports/2015/11/19/125787/dapa-matters/ [https://perma.cc/NLE4-E3YX].
7. Brief for the State Respondents at 74, United States v. Texas, No. 15-674 (U.S. Mar.
28, 2016).
8. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2271 (2016).
9. Full Text: Donald Trump's Immigration Speech, WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 31, 2016,
10:57 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/full-text-donald-trumps-immigration -
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Trump has declared that all immigration laws will be vigorously enforced and that
anyone who enters the United States illegally will be subject to immediate
deportation. He has further pledged to triple the number of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) agents to achieve these goals.10
Despite this aggressive campaign rhetoric, President Trump has since backed off
on his promise to deport all undocumented immigrants. After taking office on
January 20, 2017, President Trump promptly signed a pair of executive orders on
immigration enforcement11 and subsequently released two memorandums outlining
how those orders are to be enforced.12 According to the memoranda, President Trump
intends to drastically expand the category of people classified as “priorities for
removal”; this dramatic policy shift could affect up to 11 million people.13
One notable aspect of the memoranda was President Trump’s preservation of
protections for DREAMers, as the memoranda explicitly states that DACA is to
remain in effect.14 Yet despite this proclamation, in early September 2017 President
Trump followed through his campaign promise and announced the effective end of
DACA.15 President Trump emphasized that he did not intend to “just cut DACA off,
but rather provide a window of opportunity for Congress to finally act,” and has given
lawmakers six months to come up with a replacement for the Obama-era program.16
If Congress is unable to create a similar, lawful program by way of legislation,
President Trump will “revisit this issue,” a statement that provides little certainty as
to the fate of the some 800,000 young, undocumented immigrants who have
benefited from DACA since its initiation in 2012.17

speech/article/2600729 [https://perma.cc/RG49-MV5C].
10. Id.
11. See Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017); Exec. Order No.
13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
12. JOHN KELLY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ENFORCEMENT OF THE
IMMIGRATION LAWS TO SERVE THE NATIONAL INTEREST (2017); JOHN KELLY, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT’S BORDER SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS POLICIES (2017).
13. Camila Domonoske & Joel Rose, What’s New In Those DHS Memos On Immigration
Enforcement?, NPR (Feb. 22, 2017, 5:40 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/02/22/516649344/whats-new-in-those-dhs-memos-on-immigration-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/R3JY-CZ9E].
14. See KELLY, ENFORCEMENT OF THE IMMIGRATION LAWS TO SERVE THE NATIONAL
INTEREST, supra note 12, at 2.
15. Adam Edelman, Trump Ends DACA Program, No New Applications Accepted, NBC
NEWS (Sept. 5, 2017, 5:57 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/trumpdreamers-daca-immigration-announcement-n798686 [https://perma.cc/ZE7H-73HB]. Under
the plan, the Trump administration has stopped considering new applications but allowed any
DACA recipients with a permit that is set to expire prior to March 5, 2018 to apply for a twoyear renewal if they applied before October 5, 2017. DHS will recognize DACA authorizations
until they expire at the end of their two-year lifespans, meaning the last authorization would
end March 5, 2020.
16. Id.
17. Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to End DACA and Calls on
Congress to Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/
us/politics/trump-daca-dreamers-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/4E3J-WWFD].
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Though President Trump’s early attempts at immigration reform indicate a sharp
reversal of the Obama administration’s immigration policy, the reality is that unless
this shift is accompanied by a drastic expansion of DHS’s resources, such a broad
policy is unlikely to prove enforceable. Lacking the necessary resources, President
Trump will thus find himself in the same position as his predecessor: tasked with
substantially narrowing enforcement priorities and, even if solely out of necessity,
exercising the broad scope of the executive’s enforcement discretion power. In light
of the controversy surrounding Obama’s actions and the recent challenge in United
States v. Texas, it will be imperative that President Trump—and any future president
for that matter—frame immigration reform in a way that will avoid a similar
constitutional challenge.
To circumvent potential separation of powers issues, future immigration policies
should involve clearly defined and transparently communicated enforcement
priorities and be framed in terms of the executive’s decision not to act against aliens
who do not fall within these defined boundaries. This Note focuses on how President
Trump and future presidents generally can achieve deferred-action-related goals
without transgressing the boundaries of permissible enforcement discretion. Part I
discusses United States v. Texas and addresses the specific challenge brought to
President Obama’s immigration policy as well as scholarly arguments regarding
DAPA’s constitutionality. Part II identifies the constitutional source of authority for
enforcement discretion and explores interplay between the executive’s somewhat
conflicting duties under the Take Care Clause. Part III looks at the development of
enforcement discretion over time and specifically within the context of immigration
law. Part IV focuses on the historically limited role of the judiciary in this area of the
law. Lastly, Part V addresses how President Trump can move forward with
implementing his own immigration policy without running into the same
constitutional roadblocks that his predecessor faced.
I. UNITED STATES V. TEXAS: DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES OF ENFORCEMENT
DISCRETION
United States v. Texas represents the most recent challenge to an act of executive
enforcement discretion. As immigration is undoubtedly one of the most divisive
issues of the twentieth century, scholars and the general public alike have weighed
in on the case that effectively brought an end to what President Obama had hoped
would be one of the central legacies of his administration: comprehensive
immigration reform.18
A. DAPA and the Constitutional Challenge
President Obama’s executive action known as DAPA would allow parents of U.S.
citizens who (a) have lived in the United States continuously since January 1, 2010;
(b) had, on November 20, 2014, a son or daughter who is a U.S. citizen or lawful

18. See Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Tie Blocks Obama Immigration
Plan, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/24/us/supreme-courtimmigration-obama-dapa.html [https://perma.cc/VZ5P-L24E].
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permanent resident; and (c) are not an enforcement priority for removal under the
November 14th, 2014, Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of
Undocumented Immigrants Memorandum19 to request deferred action and
employment authorization for a period of three years.20 Requests for deferred action
were to be considered by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services on a caseby-case basis.21
DAPA was challenged by the state of Texas along with several other states,
resulting in a preliminary injunction under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).22 The injunction was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
reasoned that since the Constitution requires a uniform rule of naturalization—and
enforcement of DAPA would interfere with the integrated statutory and regulatory
schemes implemented by Congress—a nationwide injunction was warranted.23 The
case was further appealed to the Supreme Court, the central issue being whether the
President acted unconstitutionally by exercising his enforcement discretion in a
manner that violated the immigration and related benefits laws currently in place.24
In response to this question, the United States Government (Petitioners)
contended that DAPA’s guidance was a perfectly lawful exercise of the Secretary’s
“broad authority to ‘[e]stablish[] national immigration enforcement policies and
priorities’”25 and “perform such acts as ‘he deems necessary for carrying out his
authority’ to ‘administ[er]’ the INA.”26 Relying in part on dicta from Arizona v.
United States, the Petitioners argued that this grant of authority reflects Congress’s
judgment that the executive has a specific need for flexibility in order to “balance
pressing, often conflicting, and rapidly evolving resource, foreign relations, national
security, and humanitarian imperatives in the immigration context.”27
On the other hand, the Respondents claimed that immigration policy (specifically,
that pertaining to aliens entering the United States and possessing a right to remain
in the country) is entrusted exclusively to Congress.28 Congress has never given the
executive carte blanche to allow aliens to be lawfully present in the United States; in
fact, Respondents contended that DAPA directly conflicts with the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) wherein Congress identifies particular categories of aliens

19. The Policies for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Undocumented
Immigrants Memorandum lists DHS’s enforcement priorities as including “national security,
public safety, and border safety.” JEH CHARLES JOHNSON, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
POLICIES FOR THE APPREHENSION, DETENTION AND REMOVAL OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS
1 (2014).
20. See 2014 Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction [https://perma.cc/38DP-DJZF].
21. Id.
22. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th
Cir. 2015), aff’d, 579 U.S. 1 (2016).
23. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187–88 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 579 U.S. 1 (2016).
24. Brief for the State Respondents, supra note 7, at 74.
25. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 14, United States v. Texas, No. 15-674 (U.S. Apr.
2016) (citation omitted).
26. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2012)).
27. Id. (citation omitted).
28. Brief for the State Respondents, supra note 7, at 2.
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who may be admitted into and present in the country.29 DAPA, the Respondents
argued, not only affirmatively grants lawful presence to millions of eligible aliens,
but goes a step further to provide additional benefits including work authorization.30
This makes DAPA more than a simple exercise of enforcement discretion and crosses
over into substantive rulemaking that directly conflicts with clear legislative
mandates laid out in the INA.31
The Supreme Court issued its decision on June 23, 2016, and the highly
anticipated opinion consisted of a single sentence: “The judgment is affirmed by an
equally divided Court.”32 Less than four months later, the Court denied the
Petitioners’ petition for a rehearing.33 Yet, not all hope is lost: because the appeal
involved only a preliminary injunction, the Court may have another opportunity to
revisit the underlying constitutional issues following a final judgment.34 Whether
they will take advantage of that opportunity remains to be seen. And in the interim,
the debate regarding the scope of the executive’s authority over immigration law will
likely only intensify.
B. Scholarly Debate: Application of Youngstown Framework to DAPA
The debate over the constitutionality of the DAPA directive necessarily implicates
the interdependence of the legislative and executive branches and raises many
muddled separation of powers issues. For instance, critics such as Robert Delahunty
and John Yoo have relied on the framework laid out in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer35 to claim that DAPA is not an exercise of case-by-case enforcement
discretion as approved by the Court in Chaney.36 In his famous concurring opinion
in Youngstown, Justice Jackson sets out a framework for defining the limits of
presidential power according to the relationship between the executive and
legislative branches. For instance, when the President acts pursuant to express or
implied authorization from Congress, his or her power is at its maximum and
includes all of the authority possessed by the executive branch plus all that Congress

29. Id. This Note will discuss relevant provisions of the INA in greater detail. See infra
Part III.B.
30. Brief for the State Respondents, supra note 7, at 11.
31. See id. at 14–17.
32. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016).
33. Rebecca Shabad, SCOTUS Denies Administration’s Request to Rehear Immigration
Case, CBS NEWS (Oct. 3, 2016, 4:10 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/scotus-deniesadministrations-request-to-rehear-immigration-case/ [https://perma.cc/KQ3Q-DP7D].
34. Zachary Price, Symposium: The Immigration Punt, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016,
2:36
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-the-immigration-punt/
[https://perma.cc/M7LJ-KU6K].
35. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In Youngstown, the
challenged executive order directed the Secretary of Commerce to seize most of the nation’s
steel mills. Id. at 583. The Supreme Court held that it was not within the President’s
constitutional authority to issue the order, since taking such an action without express authority
from Congress intrudes on the lawmaking power of the legislative branch. Id. at 586.
36. See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 781 (2013).
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is able to delegate.37 When the President acts in absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he or she is within the “zone of twilight” where the two
branches have concurrent authority (or there is an uncertain distribution between the
two); here, the President can rely only on the independent powers of the executive
branch.38 Lastly, when the President acts incompatibly with the express or implied
intent of Congress, presidential power is at its “lowest ebb,” and he or she can rely
upon only the executive powers minus any constitutional powers that Congress may
possess.39
The core of Delahunty and Yoo’s argument is that, since Congress failed to enact
Obama’s DREAM Act,40 President Obama now finds himself in Youngstown
category three (“the lowest ebb”).41 Similarly, Professor Josh Blackman asserts that
“the President is not acting in concert with Congress; Congress rejected or failed to
pass immigration reform bills reflecting this policy numerous times.”42 Here
Blackman flatly dismisses the possibility of either a category one or category two
analysis because DAPA is in clear conflict with congressional intent, and thus
President Obama could not be operating in a “zone of twilight.”43 This argument,
Professor Laurence Tribe asserts, treats Congress’s failure to act as an expression of
intent and thereby presupposes that Congress can convert this supposed “will” into
law without following the constitutional lawmaking process of bicameralism and
presentment.44
In actuality, applying the Youngstown framework is a matter of statutory
construction. Tribe argues that the principles guiding President Obama’s DACA and
DAPA programs are directly influenced by the INA and “give concrete and publicly
articulated expression to those congressional priorities.”45 He supports this assertion
by pointing to the INA’s concern for preserving unity of families composed of U.S.
citizens and immigrants.46 The INA also has an expressed purpose to prioritize the
deportation of criminals; specifically, Congress has directed DHS to “prioritize the
identification and removal of aliens convicted of a crime by the severity of that
crime.”47 Consistent with this purpose, DAPA prioritizes aliens convicted of criminal
offenses involving participation in a criminal street gang, the majority of felony
offenses within the convicting jurisdiction, offenses classified as “aggravated

37. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. The DREAM Act would have provided a path to citizenship for more than two million
undocumented immigrants who entered the United States as children. See Development,
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2011, H.R. 1842, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011).
41. See generally Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 36.
42. Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law,
19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 213, 265 (2015) (citing Elisha Barron, Recent Development, The
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
623, 631–38 (2011)).
43. Id. at 267.
44. Laurence H. Tribe, Transcending the Youngstown Triptych: A Multidimensional
Reappraisal of Separation of Powers Doctrine, 126 YALE L.J. F. 86, 98 (2016).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 10 (citation omitted).
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felonies” under the INA, and certain misdemeanor offenses.48 As for the
constitutionality of DAPA’s benefits component, proponents assert that Congress has
long afforded the executive branch broad discretion to grant work authorization.49
Considering these arguments together, the alleged unconstitutionality of President
Obama’s immigration initiative hinges on how it is categorized according to
Youngstown. If the President acts in concert with congressional will when exercising
enforcement discretion, such an action implicates no separation of powers issue. But
the line is not always so clear, particularly in the current climate of legislative
gridlock.
II. TAKE CARE: CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DUTY TO FAITHFULLY
EXECUTE THE LAW
In order to analyze the constitutionality of an exercise of enforcement discretion,
it is necessary to consider the principal source of the executive’s authority in this
area: the Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution.50 As it has been interpreted
throughout history, the Take Care Clause appears to stand for two, “at times
diametrically opposed” propositions.51 On the one hand, the provision is understood
to impose a duty upon the President to comply with and execute statutory directives
as enacted by the legislature.52 On the other, it is viewed as a source of presidential
power, or a means of securing the executive’s control over federal law enforcement.53
The somewhat confusing result of these conflicting interpretations is that the Take
Care Clause forms the constitutional basis for the executive’s obligation to enforce
the law as well as his discretion not to do so.
Of course, the President plays an integral role in the legislative process through
exercise of the various constitutional powers afforded to the executive branch.54
However, once that bill has been signed into law (i.e., after the President has signed
or the Presidential veto has been overridden), the President’s role in the process
transitions to one of execution. The Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted the
Take Case Clause to safeguard presidential control over the enforcement of

48. Id.
49. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (2012).
50. See U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 3 (providing that “[the President] shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed”).
51. TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43708, THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE AND
EXECUTIVE DISCRETION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAW 3 (2014).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 4.
54. These powers derive principally from Article II, Section 3, Article I, Section 7, and
the general executive power afforded to the President under Article II, Section 1. Id. at 4,
nn.18–20; see also U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 3 (“He shall from time to time give to the Congress
Information on the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures
as he shall judge necessary and expedient . . . .”); U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 7 (“Every Bill which
shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law,
be presented to the President of the United States; If he approves he shall sign it, but if not he
shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated . . . .); U.S.
CONST. Art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States
of America.”).
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legislatively enacted directives.55 For instance, in INS v. Chadha, the Court ruled that
the legislative veto was unconstitutional.56 Critics saw the legislative veto as an
attempt to encroach upon executive authority, but constitutional scholar Louis Fisher
asserts that this critique overlooks the fact that the legislative veto is actually a
mechanism for balancing the interests of the two branches: “[T]he desire of
administrators for greater discretionary authority and the need of Congress to
maintain control short of passing another public law.”57 The Chadha Court
nevertheless insisted that it was unconstitutional to allow Congress to take
affirmative action to change the law without complying with the constitutional
process for enacting legislation (bicameralism and presentment to the President).58
Following Chadha, Bowsher v. Synar invalidated a law that would have delegated
some the executive branch’s enforcement authority to the legislative branch.59
Bowsher involved a challenge to the Budget and Accounting Act, specifically its
creation of the office of the Comptroller General.60 The Comptroller General was to
be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate to serve a
single fourteen-year term, and was removable only at the initiative of Congress.61 In
its opinion, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]o permit an officer controlled by
Congress to execute the laws would be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto. .
. . This kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws . . . is
constitutionally impermissible.”62
Thus, interpretations of the Take Care Clause have recognized the need for the
President to maintain a certain level of control over those who enforce the law, as
well as discretion as to how the laws are enforced. This kind of discretion has been
repeatedly recognized as essential to carrying out the executive’s constitutional duty
under the clause.63 However, it is also limited in the sense that it does not extend to

55. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (suggesting that vesting
authority to enforce federal law in state and local officers may intrude on executive power to
oversee those in charge of executing the law). But see, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1988) (holding that the establishment of Independent Counsel to investigate cases involving
serious federal crimes and high-ranking public officials did not interfere with President’s duty
to faithfully execute the law).
56. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding that the legislative veto provision
in 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorized Congress to invalidate
the Attorney General’s decision to allow a deportable alien to remain in the United States, was
unconstitutional).
57. Louis Fisher, Judicial Misjudgments About the Lawmaking Process: The Legislative
Veto Case, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 705, 706 (1985); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 973–
74 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
58. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 957–59.
59. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 714 (1986).
60. Id. at 716.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 726–27. The Supreme Court reasoned that Congress could “simply remove, or
threaten to remove, an officer for executing laws in any fashion found to be unsatisfactory to
Congress.” Id. By placing responsibility for execution of the Act in the hands of someone
subject to removal only by Congress itself, the Court states that Congress has effectually
retained control over the Act’s execution and intruded into the executive function. Id. at 734.
63. GARVEY, supra note 51, at 10 (citations omitted).
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presidential decisions to affirmatively suspend federal law or flat-out refusals to
comply with clear legislative mandates or restrictions.64 The power also does not
encompass constitutional violations—such as basing the decision to prosecute on
arbitrary classifications like race and religion—under the guise of exercising
discretion in law enforcement.65
In sum, the executive’s power under the Take Care Clause is simultaneously
broad and limited. In the specific context of enforcement discretion, it is frequently
infeasible, if not altogether impossible, to fully implement federal law.66
Congressional instructions—even when laid out in detail in explicit statutory
enactments—are often disconnected from the reality of the situation.67 In light of
Youngstown and court-imposed limitations on the President’s ability to delegate
executive powers and Congress’s ability to retain power for itself through
mechanisms like the legislative veto, the President frequently confronts the question:
if Congress’s “will” cannot be fully effectuated, how can the statutes it has enacted
be enforced in a way that respects the rule of law?
III. ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION: INTERACTION BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
EXECUTIVE
A. Heckler v. Chaney: Early Recognition of Executive Enforcement Discretion
Out of the gap between legislative policy and resource appropriation arose the
doctrine of enforcement (or prosecutorial) discretion. Enforcement discretion
“developed without express statutory authorization,” but has nonetheless become a
“principal feature of the [immigration] removal system.”68 As defined by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 2000, “[p]rosecutorial discretion is
the authority that every law enforcement agency has to decide whether to exercise its
enforcement powers against someone.”69 Consequently, enforcement discretion
involves decisions related to whom and when to prosecute as well as decisions not
to prosecute.
The Supreme Court confirmed executive and administrative authority over
enforcement decisions in its seminal opinion in Heckler v. Chaney. In Chaney, prison
inmates who had been convicted of capital offenses and sentenced to death by legal
injection petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) alleging that the use
of drugs for capital punishment purposes violated the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA).70 The inmates requested that the FDA take certain enforcement actions to
prevent violations of the FDCA. After the FDA refused this request, the inmates
proceeded to petition the court seeking the same enforcement actions; however, the
Supreme Court held that the FDA’s decision not to take the requested enforcement

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 13.
Tribe, supra note 44, at 96.
Id.
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE FACT SHEET ON
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION GUIDELINES 1 (2000).
70. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 821 (1985).
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actions was not subject to review under the APA.71 Hence, the Chaney decision
established that administrative non-enforcement is presumptively unreviewable
under the APA. In so holding, the Court acknowledged that
an agency's refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the
characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch
not to indict—a decision which has long been regarded as the special
province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who
is charged by the Constitution to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”72
The Chaney opinion also offers guiding principles for valid exercises of
executive enforcement discretion, specifically noting that enforcement decisions
should reflect “factors which are peculiarly within [the enforcing agency’s]
expertise” including considerations such as “whether the agency has enough
resources to undertake the action,” and “whether agency resources are best spent on
this violation or another.”73 Other relevant considerations may include “the proper
ordering of [agency] priorities,” and “whether the particular enforcement action
requested best fits the agency’s overall policies.”74
In subsequent decisions, lower courts have interpreted Chaney to mean that
enforcement decisions made on a case-by-case basis are constitutionally permissible
and judicially unreviewable because they do not implicate many of the separation of
powers concerns discussed above, and also because these decisions inevitably rest
on “the sort of mingled assessments of fact, policy, and law . . . that are, as Chaney
recognizes, peculiarly within the agency’s expertise and discretion.”75 Furthermore,
the Office of Legal Counsel asserts that enforcement decisions made on an individual
basis after consideration of case-specific factors are generally unlikely to constitute
“general polic[ies] that [are] so extreme as to amount to an abdication of [the
agency’s] statutory responsibilities” as prohibited by Chaney.76
On the other hand, constitutional scholars have suggested that complete,
prospective categorical non-enforcement of a particular law is not a permissible
exercise of enforcement discretion: the two concepts are conceptually distinct.77
Categorical non-enforcement differs from enforcement discretion in the sense that
categorical non-enforcement encompasses “presidential authority to refuse to
enforce any and all laws the President believes are unconstitutional” in their
entirety.78 On the other hand, Chaney empowers the Executive and authorized
executive branch officials to discriminate among issues or cases to pursue: in the

71. Id. at 824–25.
72. Id. at 832.
73. Id. at 831.
74. Id. at 831–32.
75. Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Peña, 37 F.3d 671, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (emphasis
omitted); see also Kenney v. Glickman, 96 F.3d 1118, 1123 (8th Cir. 1996).
76. OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 7 (citations omitted).
77. See, e.g., Leigh Osofsky, The Case for Categorical Nonenforcement, 69 TAX L. REV.
73, 132 (2015).
78. Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable
Statutes, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 10 (2000).
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strictest sense, these decisions should be made on an individualized, or case-by-case
basis.79
B. Enforcement Discretion’s Specific Application to Immigration Law
In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized that the U.S.
government’s “broad, undoubted power” over immigration derives from Article I of
the Constitution and therefore rests principally in the legislative branch.80 Thus,
DHS’s authority to remove aliens from the country is derived from and rests on the
INA, which establishes a detailed scheme to regulate the processes of immigration
and naturalization.81 In addition to its extensity, federal regulation of immigration
and alien status is also complex.82 For instance, Congress identifies numerous
grounds for “inadmissibility” to the United States; in general "[a]n alien present in
the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United
States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is
inadmissible."83 The INA provides that inadmissible aliens (those who do not
lawfully gain entry to the United States) as well as lawfully admitted aliens who fail
to maintain their legal status are subject to deportation.84
Despite these far-reaching provisions, Congress has appropriated enough
resources for DHS to remove85 fewer than 400,000 of the eleven million aliens
present in the United States each year.86 In recognition of these constraints, the INA
also provides executive officials with the means to temporarily delay or suspend
removal of unauthorized immigrants. For example, executive officials have the
authority to parole an alien into the country—without formally admitting that
individual—“for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,”87 and
immigration officials also have the authority to grant asylum and cancel removal.88

79. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 834.
80. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394–95.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012) (providing a list of certain classes of aliens
ineligible to receive visas or to be admitted into the United States). More specifically, aliens
may be removed if fall within one or more classes of “deportable aliens,” including those who
were inadmissible at the time of entry, have been convicted of certain crimes, or meet other
criteria set by federal law. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012).
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012).
85. The INA also specifies the procedures for removing deportable aliens from the United
States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012) (governing initiation of removal proceedings); 8 U.S.C. §
1129(a) (2012) (describing removal proceedings); 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (2012) (detailing the
procedure for expedited removal of aliens who have been convicted of committing aggravated
felonies).
86. OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 9 (citing E-mail from David Shahoulian, DHS Deputy
General Counsel, to Karl R. Thompson, OLC Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
(Nov. 19, 2014)).
87. Humanitarian or Significant Public Benefit Parole for Individuals Outside the United
States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/archive/2014executive-actions-immigration [https://perma.cc/6QZD-XMD9].
88. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012) (asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (2012)
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However, prior to turning to these statutory mechanisms for granting relief,
“[f]ederal officials . . . must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all”;
officials also have the authority to terminate proceedings and decline to execute final
orders of deportation once proceedings have initiated.89
Decision making regarding an alien’s status involves a wide range of
considerations.90 As the Arizona Court explained, granting broad discretion to
immigration officials embraces “immediate human concerns.”91 For example, an
unauthorized worker attempting to support his or her family likely poses a lesser
threat than an alien who has committed a serious crime.92 The equities of a particular
case may turn on a number of factors including “whether the alien has children born
in the United States, long ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military
service.”93 Additionally, the Arizona Court notes that some discretionary decisions
involve important policy choices, as immigration policy has wide-ranging effects
including its influence on trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations with
other countries.94 Given the dynamic nature of relations between countries, the
executive branch is tasked with ensuring that U.S. enforcement policies are
consistent with the Nation’s broader foreign policy.95
C. The Meaning of “Deferred Action”
The term “deferred action” refers to an immigration official’s decision that no
action will proceed against a deportable alien; in other words, it is an exercise of
administrative discretion that results in temporary deferral of the removal of that
individual.96 Immediately following the enactment of the INA, INS officials began
exercising enforcement discretion in order to grant “non-priority” status to
removable aliens for humanitarian reasons.97
In 1975, the INS issued the first specific instruction related to deferred action. The
INS Instruction stated that “[i]n every case where the district director determines that
adverse action would be unconscionable because of the existence of appealing
humanitarian factors, he shall recommend consideration for deferred action
category.” The Instruction further provided a list of factors to consider when
determining whether a case should be recommended for deferred action, including:
(1) advanced or tender age; (2) many years presence in the United States; (3) physical
or mental condition requiring care or treatment in the United States; (4) family

(cancellation of removal).
89. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 484 (1999).
90. These considerations will be explored in detail. See infra Part II.C.
91. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 395.
95. See generally Mathew Coleman, Between Public Policy and Foreign Policy: U.S.
Immigration Law Reform and the Undocumented Migrant, 29 URB. GEOGRAPHY 4 (2008).
96. Reno, 525 U.S. at 484–85 (citing 6 Charles Gordon et al., Immigration Law and
Procedure § 72.03[2][h] (1998)).
97. Letter from E.A. Loughran, INS Associate Commissioner, to Leon Wildes (July 16,
1973).
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situation in the United States; and (5) criminal, immoral or subversive activities or
affiliations.98 The regional commissioner must thereafter approve the district
director's recommendation.99 If approved, the alien is alerted that the INS will take
no action will to disturb his immigration status, or that his departure from the United
States has been deferred indefinitely, whichever is appropriate under the
circumstances of the particular case.100
The INS Instruction has experienced a number of changes over time, but the
amendments made in response to Nicholas v. INS—a Ninth Circuit case in which the
Court held that the Instruction operated as a substantive rule as opposed to an internal
procedural guideline101—were of particular significance. After Nicholas, the INS
amended the Instruction to affirmatively state that grants of deferred action status
were in no sense a noncitizen’s “entitlement”; rather, they are a matter of
administrative choice.102 According to Professor Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, the
INS’s decision to amend after Nicholas was likely motivated by the Ninth Circuit’s
“compassion-based theory for upholding judicial review.”103 By reframing the
Instruction as a measure of “pure administrative convenience,” the DHS sought to
avoid further judicial review of administrative decisions.104
The criteria outlined in the published INS Instruction was later affirmed and
widely publicized in a memorandum issued by former INS Commissioner Doris
Meissner. Meissner’s memorandum details a range of possible actions taken by
immigration enforcement officials that would fall within the meaning of enforcement
discretion. The memorandum specifically provides that enforcement discretion may
be exercised in a proactive manner such as granting affirmative relief in the form of
deferred action.105 However, enforcement discretion may not be used to affirmatively
grant or approve legal permanent residence or citizenship: this can only be conferred
through statutory authority.106 By way of example, the memorandum provides: “the
INS has prosecutorial discretion not to place a removable alien in proceedings, but it
does not have prosecutorial discretion to approve a naturalization application by an
alien who is ineligible for that benefit under the INA.”107
Furthermore, enforcement discretion extends only up to the substantive and
jurisdictional limits of the law; it may never be used to justify actions that are illegal

98. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, O.I. §
103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1975).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit made several
other conclusions related to the language of the Instructions: “(1) [t]he sole basis for granting
relief is the presence of humanitarian factors; (2) [t]he Instruction is directive in nature; and
(3) [t]he effect of such relief upon a deportation order is to defer it indefinitely.” Id. at 806.
102. Wadhia, supra note 3, at 250–51.
103. Id. at 251.
104. Id. The various constraints on judicial review of exercises of enforcement discretion
are explored further. See infra Part III.
105. Memorandum from INS Commissioner Doris Meissner on Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion 2 (Nov. 17, 2000), http://www.scribd.com/doc/22092970/INS-Guidance-MemoProsecutorial-Discretion-Doris-Meissner-11-7-00 [https://perma.cc/VWV3-Z88Z].
106. Id. at 3.
107. Id. at 3–4.
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under relevant law, or actions that may be legal in other contexts but are not within
the authority of the agency or officer undertaking the action.108 Finally, Meissner
acknowledges that:
[E]xercising prosecutorial discretion does not lessen the INS’
commitment to enforce the immigration laws to the best of our ability. It
is not an invitation to violate or ignore the law. Rather, it is a means to
use the resources we have in a way that best accomplishes our mission
of administering and enforcing the immigration laws of the United
States.109
The development and expansion of the enforcement discretion doctrine over time
demonstrates its increasingly important role in national regulatory policy. In its
purest form, enforcement discretion contemplates striking a delicate but necessary
balance of power between the legislative and executive branches, with the ultimate
goal of “mak[ing] the norms of law actual: [enforcement] aims to make those norms
obtain in the world.”110
IV. THE HISTORICALLY LIMITED ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
Although the doctrine of enforcement discretion primarily implicates the
executive and legislative branches, the judiciary has a role to play as well. As the
above discussion demonstrates, it is a well-established principle that acts of executive
discretion are granted deference but they are by no means immune from judicial
review. Rather, as a general rule, “whenever the executive branch exceeds its express
or implied congressional mandate, the matter is subject to judicial review.”111
Nonetheless, it has become increasingly apparent that the exceptions have all but
swallowed this “rule,” and there are significant ambiguities regarding the scope and
rationale of judicial power in this context. In light of recent litigation—particularly
United States v. Texas—clarifying the boundaries of judicial power in this area has
gained “new urgency.”112
A. Presumptive Unreviewability
Addressing the Court’s role in the enforcement process, Justice Rehnquist
remarked in Heckler v. Chaney that “when an agency refuses to act it generally does
not exercise its coercive power over an individual's liberty or property rights, and
thus does not infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to protect.”113

108. Id. at 4.
109. Id.
110. Joshua Kleinfeld, Enforcement and the Concept of Law, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 293,
296 (2011).
111. Patrick J. Charles, The Sudden Embrace of Executive Discretion in Immigration Law,
55 WASHBURN L.J. 59, 72 (2015).
112. Zachary S. Price, Law Enforcement as Political Question, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1571, 1572 (2016).
113. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832 (emphasis omitted).
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Rehnquist further noted that “when an agency does act to enforce, that action itself
provides a focus for judicial review, inasmuch as the agency must have exercised its
power in some manner.”114 In these circumstances, the judiciary can at least review
said action to determine whether the agency has exceeded the scope of its statutory
powers.115 By delineating between action and inaction, Chaney placed qualified
exercises of enforcement discretion (specifically, non-enforcement) within the
category of actions “committed to agency discretion by law” and exempted from
review under the APA.116 According to the Court, non-enforcement is generally
unsuitable for review because it hinges on a complicated balancing of various factors
that fall specifically within the agency’s expertise.117
The Chaney holding was in clear tension with traditional doctrinal principles.
Prior to this case, the Supreme Court had embraced a strong presumption in favor of
judicial review of administrative action; by contrast, the Chaney Court invoked a
background “tradition” of executive enforcement discretion in order to exempt these
decisions from “the demand for legitimation through review.”118 In effect, as far as
the Court had previously sought to validate agencies’ performance of traditional
legislative and judicial responsibilities by specifically interpreting the APA for
judicial review, Chaney reflects a “countervailing impulse to insulate a
characteristically executive form of decision from judicial scrutiny.”119
B. Additional Procedural Hurdles
The Supreme Court has further insulated enforcement discretion decisions from
judicial scrutiny through its strict interpretation of the “case or controversy”
requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. For instance, in Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., a single mother sought an injunction against the discriminatory
application of a Texas criminal statute making a parent’s willful desertion, neglect,
or refusal to provide for child support and maintenance of a child under the age of
eighteen a misdemeanor.120 The statute made no distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate children, but the Texas courts had consistently interpreted it to impose
no duty of support on the parents of illegitimate children.121 The Court rejected the
mother’s standing to challenge Texas’s decision not to prosecute certain fathers who
failed to pay child support, reasoning that “in the unique context of a challenge to a
criminal statute, appellant ha[d] failed to allege a sufficient nexus between her injury
and the government action which she attacks to justify judicial intervention.”122 To
invoke the power of judicial review, a plaintiff must show that he or she sustained
some type of direct injury as a result of the statute’s enforcement.123

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Price, supra note 112, at 1577 n.26.
Id. at 1578–79 (quoting Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831–32).
Id. at 1578.
Id. at 1579.
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 615–17 (1973).
Id.
Id. at 617–18.
Id. at 618.
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Following the Linda R.S. decision, the Court constitutionalized this concept by
defending strict Article III standing requirements on separation of powers principles.
In Allen v. Wright, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a plaintiff attempting to
enjoin agency activity must first overcome the established principle that the
government is entitled to “the widest latitude in the ‘dispatch of its own internal
affairs.’”124 And
[w]hen transported into the Art. III context, that principle, grounded as it
is in the idea of separation of powers, counsels against recognizing
standing in a case brought, not to enforce specific legal obligations
whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the
apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties.125
The Court went on to recognize that the Constitution assigns the duty to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed” exclusively to the President under Article III,
Section 3.126
After addressing these self-imposed limitations on judicial review of executive
enforcement decisions, Associate Professor Zachary Price goes so far as to argue that
executive non-enforcement authority implicates the political question doctrine and is
therefore entirely unreviewable.127 Price contends that, like other core executive
functions, enforcement discretion is “an area where institutional limitations on courts
place a gap between what executive officials ideally should do and what courts will
require from them.”128 Executive enforcement decisions, or even broader
enforcement policies, may violate traditional understanding of the executive’s duty
to faithfully execute laws, yet nonetheless still evade judicial scrutiny.129
As the various limiting doctrines demonstrate, the relevant case law is somewhat
of a jumbled mess that raises several unanswered questions relating to its scope and
underlying justifications. What is clear, however, is that judicial review has proven
to be a relatively inefficient and ineffective check on executive power to exercise
discretion. As history and precedent have proven, it is not a matter of whether an
executive may exercise this discretion, but a matter of how.

124. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961)).
125. Id. at 761.
126. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 3.
127. Price, supra note 112, at 1638–39.
128. Id. at 1573–74.
129. Id. at 1619. To illustrate this point, Price refers to the Obama administration’s
marijuana enforcement policies. Although these policies are “framed in heavily caveated and
noncommittal terms,” they might go far enough as to represent a form of illegitimate policybased non-enforcement by violating the appropriate adherence to legislative policy and
relevant statutory schemes. Nonetheless, judicial second-guessing of this kind of executive
action involves questions of relative significance and appropriate “managerial” focus that
courts have generally deemed unmanageable. Id.
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V. MOVING FORWARD: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION
Irrespective of the current debate over the scope of the enforcement power, the
fact remains that throughout the twentieth century U.S. presidents have continually
exercised this power in order to assure the best use of the limited supply of
governmental resources as well as to assert specific policy agendas.130 And as history
also demonstrates, this practice has appreciable value: enforcement discretion
empowers the executive to adjust legislative policy according to unforeseen or
changed circumstances, encourages innovative policy reform, and protects against
the threat of legislative inertia.131 Despite these clear advantages, President Obama’s
initiative faced unprecedented backlash.132
For President Obama, perhaps the fatal error was framing his policy in terms of
an affirmative, large-scale deferred action plan. Although President Obama was
arguably forced to take this path given legislative gridlock that defined his
presidency,133 such an approach opened the door to judicial review and encouraged
critics to characterize DAPA as a unilateral lawmaking exercise. The arguments
raised in United States v. Texas as well as those made by scholars on both sides of
the debate are particularly instructive in terms of evaluating where President Obama
went “wrong” from a separation of powers perspective, and how future presidents
might accomplish similar goals while ideally avoiding constitutional challenge
altogether.
A. Framing Enforcement Priorities: Distinguishing Nonstatus from Lawful
Presence
Given the INA’s prioritization of criminals,134 President Trump’s immigration
policy (or at least what he has publicly communicated and acted on thus far) appears
to be aligned with congressional intent in that critical respect. However, prior to
announcing the phaseout of DACA, President Trump also declared on a number of
occasions his intention to “work something out” for the large number of unauthorized
immigrants who came to the United States as children and have since become
productive members of society.135 President Trump has since indicated in a tweet that

130. See generally Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1031 (2013).
131. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux,
125 YALE L.J. 104, 107 (2015).
132. In its Supreme Court Brief, the Government points to over twenty deferred action
policies since 1960—including George H.W. Bush’s Family Fairness policy—that were
deemed lawful exercises of the enforcement power. See Reply Brief for the Petitioners, supra
note 25, at 15.
133. See generally ISSUES IN AMERICAN POLITICS: POLARIZED POLITICS IN THE AGE OF
OBAMA (John Dumbrell ed., 2013) (detailing the partisanship of contemporary U.S. politics
and the issues it has raised for the Obama administration).
134. See supra text accompanying note 47.
135. See, e.g., Michael Scherer, 2016 Person of the Year: Donald Trump, TIME, Dec. 19,
2016, at 24. In his interview with TIME Magazine, Trump declared, “We’re going to work
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he will “revisit” the issue if Congress is unable to “legalize DACA.”136 This comment
seems to imply that he would be willing to act within the scope of his own authority
if Congress fails to act. And if President Trump acts to implement any comprehensive
deferred-action-style plan to protect these individuals, he will undoubtedly face the
same obstacles that President Obama faced with respect to DAPA. Ultimately, how
Trump frames his immigration plans will have a significant impact on how it is
received by Congress, the judiciary, and the greater public.
To illustrate this point, consider the treatment of the legislative veto. In Chadha,
the Supreme Court singlehandedly invalidated a device that the legislative branch
had been using for more than fifty years.137 Yet rather than inhibiting the practice,
Congress continued to place legislative vetoes in its bills in addition to adopting
informal agreements with agency committees.138 Furthermore, Congress
accomplished the same result indirectly and through subtler means such as crafting
House and Senate rules and joint resolutions, so the Court’s decision simply “[drove]
underground” a set of legislative vetoes that formerly operated in plain sight.139 And
ultimately the Court’s rigid adherence to traditional, formalized lawmaking
processes encouraged non-compliance, subtle evasion, and “a system of lawmaking
that is now more convoluted, cumbersome, and covert than before.”140
There are clear parallels to be drawn between the legislative veto as scrutinized in
Chadha and deferred action as addressed in United States v. Texas, at least in terms
of potential effect on executive transparency. More specifically, Professor Michael
Kagan contends that President Obama’s actions have significantly altered the
dynamics of executive immigration policy for three reasons: (1) his actions are
substantial in scale, (2) his policies are highly transparent, and (3) President Obama
has intentionally drawn publicity to his policies, thereby “inject[ing] discretionary
immigration policy into national politics at the highest level.”141 While it is certainly
not a new practice to develop guidelines for exercising discretion, it was during the
Obama administration that immigration agencies began announcing and
disseminating to the public these internal guidelines.142 In doing so, President Obama
more or less institutionalized the exercise of enforcement discretion by making it
more rule-like and centralized.143

something out that’s going to make people happy and proud . . . . They got brought here at a
very young age, they’ve worked here, they’ve gone to school here. Some were good students.
Some have wonderful jobs. And they’re in never-never land because they don’t know what’s
going to happen.” Id.
136. Sophie Tatum, Trump: I'll 'Revisit' DACA if Congress Can't Fix in 6 Months, CNN
POLITICS (Sept. 6, 2017, 9:13 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/05/politics/donald-trumprevisit-daca/index.html [https://perma.cc/QA2X-75GM].
137. See Fisher, supra note 57, at 705.
138. Id. at 706–07.
139. Id. at 707, 711.
140. Id. at 710–11.
141. Michael Kagan, The New Era of Presidential Immigration Law, 55 WASHBURN L.J.
117, 121 (2015).
142. Michael Kagan, A Taxonomy of Discretion: Refining the Legality Debate About
Obama’s Executive Actions on Immigration, 92 WASH. U.L. REV. 1083, 1095 (2015).
143. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 131, at 111. It is important to note, however, that to the
extent that executive action becomes more rule-like, it may trigger the notice and comment
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Reflecting on the implications of these changes, Kagan believes it is advantageous
for a new president to have the ability to rapidly alter how immigration law is
enforced—so long as this change is made transparently.144 The executive’s actions
enhance political accountability if discretion is exercised transparently.145 However,
Kagan also notes that the easier it is to shift enforcement policies, the more unstable
immigration law will be (particularly in the face of political change of the kind the
country is currently experiencing).146 Given the challenge in United States v. Texas,
there is also the chance that President Obama’s transparency will discourage future
presidents from taking a similar approach. Now more than ever—from the agency’s
perspective—transparency about deferred action and enforcement priorities may be
perceived as not worth the risk. “Transparent rules tend to spotlight a value choice.
Opponents of that choice will attack the agency's action, forcing the agency to expend
its own resources for defense. Rules having low transparency thus become more
attractive, since they conceal value choices.”147
Irrespective of its effect on transparency, President Obama’s blocked attempt at
immigration reform will certainly influence President Trump’s strategy in terms of
the means he chooses to implement his own deferred action plan. The central focus
of Respondents’ Supreme Court brief is the assertion that DAPA was
unconstitutional in the sense that it “affirmatively grants lawful presence to aliens
who would otherwise be unlawfully present.”148 This emphasis on the concept of
“lawful presence” allowed Respondents to assert that President Obama took an
action to change the status and bestow substantial benefits of a mass amount of
undocumented aliens.149 In light of this controversial interpretation of DAPA, future
immigration policies would be better suited for constitutional challenge if framed in
terms of “inaction,” or rather as forbearance from removing qualified aliens. This
approach is more consistent with the overall function and purpose of deferred action
and does not raise the same issues related to usurpation of the legislative function.
Indeed, deferred action is simply the “‘discretion to abandon’ the ‘initiation or
prosecution of various stages in the deportation process.’ . . . But a decision not to
initiate enforcement action cannot transform unlawful conduct into lawful
conduct.”150 Inaction is also more difficult to classify under the traditional
Youngstown framework. In particular, it is difficult to identify a specific violation of

procedures of the APA. See, e.g., DANIEL T. SHEDD & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43710, A PRIMER ON THE REVIEWABILITY OF AGENCY DELAY AND ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
9–10 (2014).
144. Kagan, supra note 141, at 127–28.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 128.
147. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and
Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 57 (2012) (quoting Colin S. Diver,
The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 106 (1983)).
148. Brief for the State Respondents, supra note 7, at 11.
149. Id. at 40–41.
150. Id. at 41; see also Kagan, supra note 142, at 1092 (“[J]udical precedents appear to
speak only to the simple decision to refrain from taking enforcement action. They do not
appear on their texts to deal with more affirmative actions, nor the kind of categorical rules
and application procedures that the Obama administration has put into effect.”).
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separation of powers principles given that Jackson’s theory of presidential power
focuses entirely on the problem of presidential action.151
This strategy could be effectively implemented through an approach involving the
public issuance of a prioritization memorandum. As referenced in the United States
v. Texas Respondents’ brief, on November 20, 2014, President Obama issued a
memorandum that defined “three categories of aliens prioritized for removal.”152 The
memorandum was not challenged in the case, as the Respondents conceded it was
enacted “pursuant to delegated authority to “[e]stablish[] national immigration
enforcement policies and priorities.”153 The first category of aliens identified in
President Obama’s memorandum includes aliens representing “threats to national
security, border security, and public safety.”154 Category one aliens are those who
generally “must be prioritized” for removal.155 The second category encompasses
“misdemeanants and new immigration violators”; these individuals generally
“should be removed.”156 Lastly, category three includes aliens who have committed
“other immigration violations” and recently received a removal order; these
individuals are the ICE’s lowest removal priority.157 The memorandum notes that it
is not intended to prohibit or discourage the apprehension, detention, and removal of
aliens who are not identified as priorities but are nonetheless unlawfully present in
the United States; however, it provides that to the greatest extent possible, resources
should be dedicated to the removal of aliens specified as priorities therein.158 Aside
from aliens who fall into these three categories, all other unlawfully present aliens
can be removed only if an ICE Field Office Director makes the determination that
removal would “serve an important federal interest.”159
Issuing a similarly structured memorandum would provide President Trump the
opportunity to expressly indicate his enforcement priorities in a manner that does not
take the form of an affirmative mandate. On February 20, 2017, President Trump did
in fact issue an official memorandum seemingly seeking to clarify the boundaries of
his immigration policy. However, the inherent problem with President Trump’s
memorandum—and what distinguishes it from that of his predecessor—is that it does
not purport to create a hierarchy of priorities or even to establish realistic priorities
at all; to the contrary, it has been described by immigration activists as a “blueprint
for ‘mass deportation.’”160 In short, President Trump’s memorandum simply dictates
that DHS personnel “should prioritize removable aliens” who meet any of the
extremely broad criteria listed within the same paragraph.161 The memorandum

151. Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers,
112 Mich. L. Rev. 1195, 1207 (2014) (referencing “the missing theory of inaction”).
152. JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 3.
153. Brief for the State Respondents, supra note 7, at 10 (citing 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (2012)).
154. JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 3.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 3–4.
157. Id. at 4.
158. Id. at 5.
159. Id.
160. See Domonoske & Rose, supra note 13.
161. See KELLY, ENFORCEMENT OF THE IMMIGRATION LAWS TO SERVE THE NATIONAL
INTEREST, supra note 12, at 2.
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drastically expands the category of immigrants classified as a “priority” without
making any meaningful distinction among the various sub-categories or making
explicit whether they are of equal significance. To illustrate this difference, consider
that under the Obama administration, “Priority 1” aliens included aliens convicted
felony offenses as well as aggravated felonies.162 On the other hand, President
Trump’s enforcement policy identifies aliens who have been convicted of any
criminal offense (no matter how minor), who have a pending criminal offense not
yet resolved, or who have committed acts that constitute a chargeable criminal
offense (even if they have not been charged).163 Lawyers and advocates say that such
language essentially criminalizes anyone residing in the country illegally.164 Since
immigrants can technically face charges for entering the country illegally, Trump’s
order and accompanying memorandum suggest that these individuals are a top
priority for deportation solely by virtue of being present in the United States.165
Considering its potentially far-reaching implications, President Trump’s
memorandum does not represent a workable exercise of enforcement discretion
because the U.S. government simply does not have the resources to prosecute all of
the roughly eleven million illegal aliens implicated by the policy.166 Thus, unless he
successfully ensures a substantial increase in DHS resources,167 President Trump will
be forced to define his priorities more narrowly in order to ensure that removal is
carried out according to his overarching policy goals. For instance, by creating a
hierarchy of priorities similar to that established in the Obama administration
memorandum, President Trump could make the most effectively use of these limited
resources by targeting a more specific class of offenders such as those with “criminal
records, gang members, and drug dealers,” a category which President Trump
referred to as his top priority prior to taking office.168 On the other hand, DREAMers
and other productive citizens would likely not fall under any category at all, thereby
allowing an ICE officer to take into account (and give more weight to) humanitarian
factors when making a determination regarding removal. Such a memorandum
provides clear direction while also affording immigration officials the necessary

162. See JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 3.
163. See KELLY, ENFORCEMENT OF THE IMMIGRATION LAWS TO SERVE THE NATIONAL
INTEREST, supra note 12, at 2.
164. Adrian Florido, How Trump Criminalized 11 Million with a Stroke of His Pen, NPR
(Jan. 28, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/01/28/512040631/how-trumpcriminalized-11-million-with-a-stroke-of-his-pen [https://perma.cc/FA8A-6P7T].
165. Id.
166. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
167. To ensure that U.S. immigration laws are enforced in accordance with his directives,
President Trump has ordered ICE to “hire 10,000 officers and agents expeditiously, subject to
available resources.” KELLY, ENFORCEMENT OF THE IMMIGRATION LAWS TO SERVE THE
NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 12, at 2 (emphasis added).
168. 60 Minutes Interview: President-elect Donald Trump (CBS television broadcast Nov.
13, 2016). In his January 2 Memorandum, President Trump makes a similar reference when
noting that, the Director of ICE may issue further guidance as to how to “allocate appropriate
resources to prioritize enforcement activities within [the above listed] categories-for example,
by prioritizing enforcement activities against removable aliens who are convicted felons or
who are involved in gang activity or drug trafficking.” KELLY, ENFORCEMENT OF THE
IMMIGRATION LAWS TO SERVE THE NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 12, at 2.
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“discretion” in carrying out their enforcement duties on a case-by-case basis.169
Therefore, it does not have the appearance of the kind of unilateral executive action
that was condemned by critics of DAPA but rather takes the form of a permissible
general policy statement.170
The potential downside of this approach is that appears to accomplish little more
than create a class of “nonstatus” aliens, or aliens that “occupy a paradoxical middle
ground between legality and illegality, loosely tethered to this country by
humanitarian concern or prosecutorial discretion.”171 This is the case because
nonstatus aliens occupy a temporary status and do not have a pathway to citizenship;
further, since nonstatus is tentative, holders have limited rights (both substantive and
procedural) and thus live in a state of enduring ambiguity.172 Yet as Professor Shapiro
points out, for many aliens, nonstatus is the only way to claim “some measure of
dignity and legitimacy from a society that places a strong stigma on unauthorized
immigrants.”173 Further, publishing his prioritization memorandum as the Obama
administration elected to do, Trump can publicly acknowledge these individuals and
in turn, unlawfully present aliens will be more certain of their status and ability to
remain in the country. In other words, while “nonstatus” does not completely
alleviate the fear of deportation (given that nonstatus is both discretionary and
temporary), at the very least an unlawfully present alien can more easily determine
what category they fall into and may find some comfort in knowing that the chances
are high that they will be left alone.174
B. Conferring Benefits: Appealing to Conservative Values
On top of publicizing his enforcement priorities, President Trump’s recent call to
lawmakers to craft a replacement for DACA provides the President the unique
opportunity to work hand in hand with Congress to craft a workable solution for the
roughly 800,000 young immigrants affected by his decision to phase out the Obamaera program. In recent statements, President Trump indicated both branches are
“talking about taking care of people, people that were brought here, people that have
done a good job, and were not brought here of their own volition.”175 While it is not
presently clear whether any plan to “take care” of these individuals would involve

169. See Brief for the State Respondents, supra note 7, at 17 (asserting that “DAPA is a
binding rule that eliminates agency officials’ discretion”); see also Blackman, supra note 42,
at 242 (“DHS weakened the scope of officer discretion by limiting the grounds for denial to
checking boxes on a template . . . . Substantively, discretion was confined to the Secretary’s
preferences, displacing any meaningful case-by-case review.”).
170. See Brief for the State Respondents, supra note 7, at 70 (“DAPA cannot be a general
policy statement because it constrains agency discretion and grants individual rights.”).
171. Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of Nonstatus, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1120 (2015).
172. Id. at 1119.
173. Id. at 1116.
174. See, e.g., Kagan supra note 141, at 122–23 (referring to the benefits of transparent
enforcement priorities).
175. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Yamiche Alcindor, Trump’s Support for Law to Protect
‘Dreamers’ Lifts Its Chances, NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/14/us/politics/trump-daca-dreamers.html [https://perma.cc/BD2Y-RSU9].
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the conferral of specific benefits, historical practice has shown that work
authorization is a practical corollary to withholding removal under the current
statutory framework. Indeed, work permits appear to be the one immigration benefit
that typically accompanies nonstatus.176
In any case, benefits granted by exercise of enforcement discretion must be
granted with caution. In fact, Professor Peter Margulies asserts that the “wholesale
conferral of benefits” is perhaps the precise feature that shifts DAPA into the domain
of agency action as opposed to unreviewable inaction.177 In addition to making the
action-inaction delineation, the United States v. Texas Respondents contended that
providing President Obama with “unchecked power to grant work authorization and
benefits to millions of aliens would be completely contrary to Congress’s ‘legislative
mandate.’”178 Critics of benefit-granting deferred action plans also suggest that
instead of merely reallocating resources from low to high priority cases, these
initiatives require the government to expend additional resources to provide benefits
for qualified aliens.179
Considering the arguably “unprecedented” practice of conferring certain benefits
upon recipients of temporary status,180 the safest option for the future President
would be to work directly with Congress regarding this component of a deferred
action plan. And with a Republican-dominated Congress, President Trump has the
opportunity to avoid the kind of bipartisan gridlock that President Obama endured
by appealing directly to the conservative values while working to create this new,
lawful deferred action program. In fact, House Speaker Paul Ryan previously
expressed his personal opinion that “for the undocumented, we have to come up with
a solution that does not involve mass deportations, that involves giving people the
ability to get right with the law, to come and earn a legal status while we fix the rest
of legal immigration.”181 Ryan also clarified that despite President Trump’s
campaign rhetoric, Congress has no intention to “erect[] a deportation force.”182
More recently, President Trump indicated that as far as replacing DACA is
concerned, Paul Ryan is “on board” and the administration is “working with
everybody,” both Republican and Democrat to craft a solution.183
With Congress’s support, Trump could potentially advocate for a narrowly
defined law providing that undocumented aliens who do not fall under any of the
prescribed priority categories and who meet certain specified qualifications are
eligible for a limited set of benefits such as work authorization. In addition to
qualifications that are considered when defining an alien’s status (such as length of

176. Heeren, supra note 171, at 1172.
177. Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion: Deferred Action, Unlawful
Presence, and Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1193 (2015).
178. Brief for the State Respondents, supra note 7, at 43.
179. See, e.g., Blackman, supra note 42, at 257 (emphasis added).
180. See Brief for the State Respondents, supra note 7, at 58–59.
181. Eric Bradner, Ryan: ‘We are not planning on erecting a deportation force’, CNN
POLITICS (Nov. 13, 2016, 3:10 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/13/politics/paul-ryandonald-trump-obamacare-deportation-force/ [https://perma.cc/K9N7-5P2Q].
182. Id. Ryan has not addressed this comment since the release of President Trump’s
memorandum calling for the expansion of ICE resources.
183. Stolberg & Alcindor, supra note 175.
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residency), qualifications for benefits might include education, past employment, and
family status. A law limited in this way has the potential to appeal to conservatives
in the sense that it would only benefit qualified individuals, or those who have
benefitted the economy and society at large while residing in the United States: This
kind of qualification-dependent law is sufficiently “water[ed] down” in order to
avoid the “welfare magnet narrative.”184
All in all, perhaps the key to aligning a law conferring benefits on nonstatus aliens
with the INA is stressing the idea that such a law does not grant permanent residence
to any eligible alien or grantee.185 At the heart of DAPA opponents’ argument against
the conferral of benefits is the assertion that “immigration statutes [do not] commit
to agency discretion the power to grant lawful presence, work authorization, and
benefits eligibility to millions of unlawfully present aliens.”186 If the immigration
plan or related law is interpreted as conferring “lawful presence” upon eligible
aliens—as was argument against DAPA—then such a law could also potentially
qualify these individuals for a host of other benefits including Social Security and
Medicare.187 Consequently, it is likely necessary (and possible) to draft a law narrow
enough to provide necessary benefits to eligible aliens that demonstrate an ability to
contribute to society while still not granting them the benefits of full citizenship.188
CONCLUSION
Throughout history, enforcement discretion has consistently proven to be an
indispensable means for making the most effective use of limited governmental
resources in the face of mass immigration. The recent challenge to President
Obama’s deferred action plan known as DAPA has sparked strong opinions from
scholars and members of the general public on both sides of the debate, and has raised
important questions regarding the precise scope of the executive’s authority over
immigration law in the process. Though there is thus far no clear answer to that
question, what has become apparent is the necessity for future Presidents to exercise
caution and tactfulness in setting enforcement priorities and—perhaps more
importantly—communicating those priorities to the greater public. To achieve his
objectives, President Trump must learn from the perceived failings of DAPA in order
to frame his immigration plans in a way that eludes constitutional challenge. Namely,

184. See Heeren, supra note 171, at 1174 (asserting that politicians acting to expand the
boundaries of nonstatus in the future will need to dilute nonstatus benefits in order to “address
the welfare magnet narrative”).
185. Aliens that are “lawfully present” in the United States are eligible for “valuable
benefits” such as Medicare and Social Security among others. Brief for the State Respondents,
supra note 7, at 1. If DAPA—or any future immigration policy—is interpreted as granting
lawful presence to unauthorized aliens, then it would effectively remove the eligibility bar for
these significant benefits. See id. at 16.
186. Brief for the State Respondents, supra note 7, at 15.
187. See Brief for the State Respondents, supra note 7, at 6.
188. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 177, at 1257 (“DAPA's award of benefits to unlawful
entrants with no reasonable prospects of obtaining a legal status is a bridge [to legal status]
too far.”).
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he should avoid crossing the somewhat ambiguous line from inaction to the type of
action that encroaches on the authority of the legislative branch. But regardless of
the precise approach any future President chooses to take, enforcement discretion
will continue to play a critical role in ensuring the efficient functioning and
development of this “nation of immigrants.”

